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This  paper  makes  the  following  contributions  to  the  literature  on  the  impact  of  trade  on  income.  First,  we  use 
heterogeneous panel cointegration techniques that are robust to omitted variables and endogenous regressors to estimate 
the effect of trade on income for 75 developed and developing countries, both for the sample, as a whole, and for each 
individual country. Second, we use a general-to-specific variable-selection approach to identify important determinants 
of the effect of trade on income. Our main findings are: (i) A one-percent increase in the trade share of GDP results, on 
average, in a statistically significant increase in income per worker of about 0.18 percent. This result is in contrast to 
previous studies, which tend to produce either unreasonably large or statistically insignificant estimates of the impact of 
trade on income. (ii) There are large cross-country differences in the income effect of trade, in particular, between 
developed and developing countries. For developed countries the income effect of trade is positive, whereas trade has, 
on average, a negative impact on income in developing countries. (iii) The cross-country heterogeneity in the impact of 
trade on income can be explained mainly by cross-country differences in primary export dependence, labor market 
regulation, and property rights protection. The level of property rights protection is positively related, while the levels 
of primary export dependence and labor market regulation are negatively related to the income effect of trade. 
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Is the effect of international trade on real income the same for all countries? Of course, this may 
seem a strange question, since we know from theory that whether or not and to what extent countries might 
gain from trade depends on several country-specific factors, including the degree of factor mobility between 
sectors, the type of specialization, and the ability of a country to invest in physical or human capital or adopt 
foreign technology. Thus, the answer to the question is a clear ―no‖—that is, the effect of trade on income 
must be highly heterogeneous across countries. Nevertheless, existing studies on trade and income use cross-
country regressions or homogeneous panel data models, which, by definition, are not able to capture the 
heterogeneity in the relationship between trade and income across countries. Moreover, and perhaps more 
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importantly, the estimates in these studies may be seriously biased in the presence of such heterogeneity. The 
reason  is  the  following.  Cross-country  differences  in  the  impact  of  trade  on  income  are  due  to  several 
country-specific factors that generally cannot be fully controlled for in cross-country regressions, and this 
fact gives rise to omitted-variable bias. Panel data regressions, on the other hand, allow control for omitted 
variables. However, traditional homogeneous panel estimators, such as the ones used in the existing trade-
income literature, produce inconsistent and potentially misleading estimates of  the average values of the 
parameters in dynamic panel data models when the slope coefficients are heterogeneous (see, e.g., Pesaran 
and Smith, 1995).  
This issue of cross-country heterogeneity in the relationship between trade and income is the subject 
of the present paper. Specifically, we make three contributions: 
(1)  We employ heterogeneous panel cointegration techniques that are robust to omitted variables and 
endogenous regressors to estimate the effect of trade on income for 75 developed and developing 
countries, both individually and as a whole. To preview the main results: We find that a one-percent 
increase in the trade share of GDP yields, on average, a statistically significant increase in income 
per worker of about 0.18 percent. This result is in contrast to previous studies, which tend to produce 
either unreasonably large or statistically insignificant estimates of the impact of trade on income. 
Furthermore, our results show that there are large cross-country differences in the income effect of 
trade, in particular between developed and developing countries; for developed countries the income 
effect of trade is positive, whereas trade has, on average, a negative impact on income in developing 
countries. 
(2)  We  adopt  a  variable-selection  approach  which  is  based  on  a  general-to-specific  methodology  to 
systematically  search  for  country-specific  conditions  that are  important  factors  in  explaining  the 
cross-country differences in the  effect  of trade  on  income. Our main result is that cross-country 
differences in the income effect of trade can be explained mainly by cross-country differences in 
primary  export dependence,  labor  market regulation, and property rights protection. To be  more 
precise, the effect of trade on income is positively related to the level of property rights protection, 
and negatively related to the degree of primary export dependence and the level of labor market 
regulation. 
(3)  A methodological contribution of this paper is the application of a two-step estimation procedure that 
combines panel and cross-sectional methods. The first step involves estimating the effect of trade on 
income for each country using heterogeneous panel estimators. The second step involves using cross-
sectional regressions with the estimated income effect from the first stage as the dependent variable. 
The aim is to identify which country-specific factors are empirically important determinants of the 
income effect of trade. 
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  The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing literature on the impact of 
trade on income. Section 3 re-examines the impact of trade on income. Section 4 analyzes the determinants 
of the income effect of trade, and Section 5 concludes.
 
 
2. Review of the empirical literature 
In this section, we review the empirical literature addressing the impact of trade on income. This 
literature can be roughly divided into two categories: cross-country studies and panel studies. To begin with, 
we  describe  the  general  empirical  approach  in  cross-country  studies.  Then,  we  summarize  the  main 
arguments and results of these studies. Finally, we discuss the results of recent panel studies in this literature.  
 
2.1. General approach in cross-country studies  
Cross-country  studies  of  the  relationship  between  trade  and  income  generally  follow  the 
methodology of Frankel and Romer (1999), who propose the following regression model:  
i i i i S c T a Y       ) ln( ,                                                                                                                   (1) 
where  ) ln( i Y is the natural logarithm of income per person or income per worker in country i,  i T  is the trade 
share of GDP (measured in logarithms or levels), and  i S  is country size, usually proxied by the logarithm of 
population and the logarithm of area. Country size is included in the regression model for two reasons. First, 
it serves as a crude proxy for the amount of trade within a country. Accordingly, the estimate of c can be 
used to assess whether countries also benefit from within-country trade. Second, because larger (smaller) 
countries tend to have more (less) opportunities for trade within their borders, and therefore lower (higher) 
trade shares, it is necessary to control for country size in estimating the impact of international trade on 
income. Otherwise,  i S  would enter the error term, thereby inducing a negative correlation between  i   and  i T  
and thus a downward bias in the estimate of   . 
As the literature on the trade-income relationship recognizes, Eq. (1) cannot be estimated by OLS, 
first, because of the likely endogeneity of trade, and second, because of omitted variables due to unobserved 
country-specific effects. The endogeneity problem can be illustrated in the following way. It is reasonable to 
assume, for example, that countries with higher income levels have better infrastructure and transportation 
systems which allow them to trade more. Moreover, high-income countries generally have institutions and 
resources needed to tax domestic economic activity, and thus need not rely on tariffs to finance government 
spending. In addition, high-income countries tend to demand a greater variety of products that are traded 
internationally. And finally, high-income countries typically offer more opportunities for firms to acquire the 
knowledge and resources necessary to enter export markets. Thus, it can be assumed that the volume of trade 
tends to  increase concurrently  with increases  in the  level  of  income. Now  imagine a situation  in which 
increased trade leads to increased income, which, in turn, feeds back into increased trade (the problem of 
reverse causality). In this case, however, the estimated OLS regression coefficient will tend to conflate these 
two effects and hence will be an inconsistent estimate of the causal effect of trade on income.  
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A second, closely related, problem is that of unobserved country-specific effects that are correlated 
with both income and trade. Given that these effects are unobserved, they are omitted from the estimation 
and  thus  enter  the  error  term,  in  turn  implying  that  the  assumption  of  independence  of  the  errors  and 
regressors is violated. To give an example, suppose that countries that eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers 
to trade also adopt policies to correct domestic market distortions and to improve institutional quality. Since 
such factors are likely to affect both trade and income, their omission will cause an upward bias in the OLS 
estimate of the impact of trade on income. 
To  overcome  these  problems,  Frankel  and  Romer  (1999)  suggest  an  instrumental-variable  (IV) 
approach. A valid instrument is correlated with the endogenous variable, but uncorrelated with the error term 
and thus not associated with the dependent variable through any channel other than the endogenous variable. 
To construct such an instrument, Frankel and Romer propose the following two-step procedure. The first step 
is to estimate a gravity equation for bilateral trade shares using distance between trading partners and country 
size as explanatory variables (components of trade, which are assumed to be independent of income). The 
second  step  involves  calculating  a  predicted  aggregate  trade  share  for  each  country  on  the  basis  of  the 
estimated coefficients of the gravity equation. This predicted trade share is then used as a geography-based 
instrument for trade in regression (1).  
 
2.2. Results of cross-country studies 
Using  the  geographically-constructed  trade  share,  Frankel  and  Romer  (1999)  find  a  large  and 
statistically significant positive effect of trade on income. Specifically, it is estimated that a one-percentage-
point increase in the trade share would cause an increase in GDP per worker of 1.97 to 2.96 percent.
1 
Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001), however, question this finding, arguing that Frankel and Romer’s 
trade instrument is invalid. More specifically, they argue that the Frankel and Romer findings simply reflect 
the impact of geography on income, rather than the impact of trade on income, since the geography-based 
instrument is correlated with other geographic variables that affect income through non-trade channels, such 
as morbidity, agricultural productivity, and institutions. To support their claim, Rodríguez and Rodrik re-
estimate the Frankel-Romer regression, adding additional controls for geography (such as distance from the 
equator, the percentage of a country’s land area that lies in the tropics, and regional dummies), and find that 
the IV coefficient estimates on trade become statistically insignificant once additional geography variables 
are included. This result is consistent with the results of Irwin and Tervio (2002) and Felbermayr (2005), 
who also obtain insignificant trade coefficients using geographical controls. 
Several other studies also include institutional variables in the IV regression. These are intended to 
explicitly control for potential income effects of the geography-based trade instrument that can be associated 
with the effects of geography on income through institutions. Frankel and Rose (2002), as well as Noguer 
and  Siscart  (2005),  for  example,  estimate  equation  (1)  with  and  without  additional  controls  for  both 
                                                        
1 Frankel and Romer (1999) interpret their results in terms of effects of trade on income per capita. In fact, they use 
income per worker as the dependent variable (see Frankel and Romer, 1999, Appendix Table A1).  
4   
geography and institutions. They detect a large and statistically significant effect of trade on income that is 
robust to the inclusion of additional control variables. A similar result is obtained by Hall and Jones (1999), 
who find a significant positive coefficient on the Frankel-Romer predicted trade share using regression (1) 
without country size but with proxies for geography and institutions. 
A common feature of these studies is that they construct the trade instrument based on the ratio of 
imports plus exports in current prices to GDP in current prices. Alcalá and Ciccone (2004), however, argue 
that  this  conventional  openness  measure  yields  downwardly  biased  estimates.  The  reason  is  as  follows. 
Suppose that trade increases productivity, but that the productivity gains are greater in the tradable than in 
the nontradable sector (a plausible assumption). This will lead to a rise in the relative price of nontradables, 
and a decrease in the trade/nominal GDP ratio under the assumption that the demand for nontradables is 
relatively inelastic, as it may raise the denominator more than the numerator. Consequently, trade-induced 
productivity gains may go hand in hand with a decline in the trade/nominal GDP ratio. To remedy this 
problem, Alcalá and Ciccone propose the use of nominal trade divided by GDP at PPP, which they call ―real 
openness‖ (whose denominator now corrects for international differences in the price of nontradable goods). 
They find, controlling for geography and institutions, that the causal effect of trade on income is statistically 
and economically significant when real openness is used, but insignificant (at the five-percent level) when 
the conventional openness measure is used.  
This result is in contrast to the results of Dollar and Kraay (2003). They construct the Frankel-Romer 
trade instrument using PPP-adjusted bilateral trade shares, as in Alcalá and Ciccone (2004), and find that the 
coefficient on the instrument for real openness turns out to be insignificant after including geographical and 
institutional  proxies.  Similarly,  Rodrik  et  al.  (2004) control  for  geography  and  institutions,  and  find  no 
significant effects of trade on income, regardless of whether real openness or the conventional openness 
measure is used. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The coefficient estimates of all these studies are summarized in Table 1. The table shows the lowest 
and highest estimates for the impact of trade on income obtained (significant coefficients are indicated by 
bold values). As can be seen, while several coefficients are considerably high and statistically significant, 
others are insignificant and sometimes negative. In particular, it appears that the studies summarized tend to 
produce either unreasonably large and statistically significant estimates of the impact of trade on income or 
insignificant  estimates.
2  The  former  can  be  explained  by  unresolved  endogeneity  and  omitted-variable 
problems. In fact, there are so many factors affecting both income and trade through various channels that it 
is very likely that even the coefficient on the geography-based trade instrument is picking up a correlation 
                                                        
2 The augmented Solow model of Mankiw et al. (1992), for example, predicts that the estimated coefficient on the log 
of the investment rate in the steady state should be about 1 across countries; that is, an increase in the investment rate by 
1% is predicted to lead to a long-run increase in GDP per worker by about 1% across countries. Given that several 
theoretical models suggest that increased trade can lead to income losses, it is theoretically implausible that the cross-
country  effect  of trade on income is greater than the cross-country effect of investment on income. Cross-country 
income regressions with coefficients on (log) trade exceeding 1 are thus hard to justify theoretically. 
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with these omitted country-specific variables. A possible explanation for the insignificant coefficients is the 
correlation  between  several  geographical  controls,  institutional  proxies,  and  the  Frankel-Romer  trade 
instrument. Dollar and Kraay (2003), for example, find that in instrumented regressions of income on trade 
and institutions, there is a severe multicollinearity problem, which makes it impossible to identify the partial 
effects of either variable on income.   
 
2.3. Results of panel studies 
Given the problems inherent to cross-country regressions, several studies use panel data techniques. 
Panel estimation makes it possible to account for unobserved country-specific fixed effects, thus eliminating 
a  possible  source  of  omitted-variable  bias.  Moreover,  by  including  lagged  explanatory  variables,  panel 
procedures allow control for potential endogeneity problems.  
Dollar and Kraay (2003, 2004), for example, apply a GMM estimation strategy, which involves (i) 
rewriting Eq. (1) as a dynamic panel data model with fixed effects, (ii) removing the fixed effects by first-
differencing, and then (iii) instrumenting the differenced right-hand-side variables using lagged values of the 
original regressors. Specifically, their regression model relates changes in per-capita growth to instrumented 
changes in the explanatory variables, such as trade (measured by real openness) and institutions. They find 
that the effect of changes in trade volumes on changes in growth is significantly positive and quite robust. 
An important difference between the panel study by Dollar and Kraay and the cross-country studies 
just discussed is the change in model specification from a relationship between trade and income in levels to 
a relationship between the variables in changes, thereby limiting the comparability of the results. Dollar and 
Kraay (2003, 2004) justify this  modification by arguing that the correlation between the changes  in the 
explanatory variables is lower than the correlation between their levels, so that potential multicollinearity 
problems between trade and institutions are minimized. However, given the fact that they use lagged levels 
of  trade  volumes  and  institutions  as  instruments,  the  potential  collinearity  problem  is  hardly  solved. 
Moreover, it is well known that lagged levels are weak instruments for the regression equation in differences 
if the variables are persistent over time. 
To reduce the potential biases associated with the difference estimator, Felbermayr (2005) uses a 
system  GMM  estimator  that  combines  the  difference  regression  with  the  level  regression  where  the 
instruments are lagged values of the differenced regressors. Consistent with most of the above-cited studies 
cited above, he finds a large and statistically significant positive effect of trade on income (using both the 
real openness and the nominal openness measure). According to his estimates, an increase in the trade/GDP 
ratio by one percentage point would increase per-capita income by about 1.5 percent. 
A different approach is used by Feyrer (2009a, 2009b). He addresses the problems of endogeneity 
and omitted variables by constructing time-varying trade instruments based on (i) changes in the effects of 
air distance and sea distance on trade over time, due to changes in transportation technology, and (ii) the 
temporary change in sea distance caused by the closure of the Suez Canal between 1967 and 1975, as a result 
of wars in the Middle East (the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War). The time variation makes possible 
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the inclusion of country fixed effects (which control for all time-invariant correlates with income, such as 
distance from the equator and the share of a country’s area that is in the tropics). Using contemporaneous 
OLS fixed-effects panel regressions, Feyrer finds that trade increases income with elasticities between 0.157 
and 0.578. Unfortunately, however, these estimates are not directly comparable to those reported in Table 1, 
given that Feyrer uses the volume of trade as an explanatory variable, rather than trade as a percentage of 
GDP. Nevertheless, Feyrer’s values seem somewhat more reasonable, although overall, they appear to be 
still relatively large compared to, for example, the capital-elasticity of output in the constant-return-to-scale 
production process.
3 
Thus, the overall picture that emerges from these studies is that trade tends to have a large positive 
impact  on  income.  Yet,  all  these  studies  are  limited  by  one  important  factor:  They  do  not  capture  the 
potential heterogeneity in the relationship between trade and income across countries. Rather, they implicitly 
assume that the effect of trade on income is the same for all countries, which is an implausible assumption as 
there is nothing in the theoretical literature to suggest such homogeneity. Furthermore, recent advances in the 
heterogeneous  panel  literature  suggest  that  estimation  and  inference  in  standard  panel  models  can  be 
misleading  when  the  slope  coefficients  differ  across  cross-sectional  units.
4  Similarly,  parameter 
heterogeneity due to omitted variables may substantially bias the results of cross-country regressions. In the 
following analysis, we will carefully examine this heterogeneity in the trade-income relationship.  
 
3. The impact of trade on income 
This section examines the impact of trade on income. Specifically, we use panel data techniques that 
allow us (i) to control for omitted-variable and endogeneity bias and (ii) to detect possible cross-country 
differences in the income effects of trade. We begin this section by first describing the empirical model and 
the  data  used  in  the  empirical  analysis.  Then,  we  examine  the  basic  time-series  properties  of  the  data. 
Thereafter, we test for the existence of a long-run relationship between trade and income, and then provide 




                                                        
3 The results by Feyrer (2009a, 2009b) should be viewed with caution, since the possibility that the instruments are 
acting through channels other than trade cannot be fully excluded. Feyrer (2009a) admits, for example, that changes in 
transportation technology might not only affect trade but also foreign direct investment and cross-border movements of 
people. Thus, the coefficient on the instrument based on the change in the effect of distance on trade may, at least in 
part, reflect the income effect of these omitted variables. Similarly, one should keep in mind that the 1967 Arab oil 
embargo was a reaction to the Six-Day War between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, while the Yom 
Kippur War between Israel on one side, and Egypt and Syria on the other, was associated with the Arab oil embargo in 
1973-74 and the worldwide energy crisis of 1973-74 (see, e.g., Salameh, 2004). Thus, it could well be that the increase 
in  sea  distance  due  to  the  closure  of  the  Suez  Canal  at  that  time  is  related  to  income  through  the  worldwide 
consequences of two oil embargos and the oil crisis of 1973-74. 
4 Pesaran and Smith (1995), for example, show that slope heterogeneity generates a correlation between the regressors 
and the error term, as well as a serial correlation in the disturbances, and thus introduces a bias in traditional panel data 
estimators. 
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3.1. Model and data 
In order to estimate the effect of international trade on income we consider a bivariate long-run 
relationship of the form 
it it i i it T t a Y        ) ln( ) ln( ,                                                                                                           (2) 
where  it Y  represents income per worker over time periods  T t ..., , 2 , 1   and countries  N i ..., , 2 , 1  .  it T  stands 
for the trade share of GDP over the same time periods and countries. The symbol ln indicates that both 
variables are log-transformed, as in Alcalá and Ciccone (2004), and the coefficient    denotes the cross-
country average of the effects of trade on income,  i  , which are allowed to be country specific and thus to 
vary across countries. The ai and δit are, respectively, country-specific fixed effects and country-specific 
deterministic time trends, capturing any country-specific omitted factors that are relatively stable over time 
or evolve smoothly over time. Accordingly, in contrast to the studies reviewed above, we do not need to 
control for omitted variable bias by including direct proxies for country size, geography, and institutions, 
since it can be assumed that all these factors are absorbed into the fixed effects and/or country-specific trend 
terms.
5 
Eq. (2) assumes that, in the  long-run, permanent changes  in the  log-level  of the trade share are 
associated with permanent changes in the log-level of income per worker. Empirically, this implies that both 
the  individual time series for income per worker and the individual series for the trade/GDP-ratio  must 
exhibit unit-root behavior and that  ) ln( it Y  must be cointegrated with  ) ln( it T . A regression consisting of two 
cointegrated variables has a stationary error term, in turn implying that no relevant integrated variables are 
omitted; any omitted nonstationary variable that is part of the cointegrating relationship would enter the error 
term, thereby producing nonstationary residuals and thus leading to a failure to detect cointegration. If, on 
the other hand, cointegration between a set of variables is detected, this same stationary relationship will also 
be  found  in an  enlarged  variable set. Thus, an important implication  of finding  cointegration  is that no 
relevant integrated variables in the cointegrating vector are omitted. Cointegration estimators are therefore 
robust  (under  cointegration)  to  the  omission  of  variables  that  do  not  form  part  of  the  cointegrating 
relationship (see, e.g., Johansen, 2000). This justifies a reduced form model such as Eq. 2 (if cointegrated). 
Thus, we select from the Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006) Penn World Table (Version 6.2) a panel 
of counties for which both real (PPP) GDP per worker and trade relative to GDP at PPP (the real openness 
measure suggested by  Alcalá and Ciccone  [2004]) have unit roots. In practice, this  means that from 97 
countries for which data on real GDP per worker and real openness are available over the period from 1960 
to 2003, we eliminate those countries for which the individual time series do not pass a simple screening for 
a unit root  via the  ADF, the PP and the KPSS tests. In addition,  we  exclude  countries  having average 
populations between 1960 and 2003 of less than one million, as well as countries for which the data received 
                                                        
5 Admittedly, changes in institutions can be abrupt, causing structural breaks in the intercept and/or trend. We therefore 
tested  whether the estimated β coefficient is biased due to potential unmodeled structural breaks. Specifically,  we 
included dummy  variables for each possible structural break detected by a sequential Wald test, and found almost 
identical β coefficients. 
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a  grade  of  ―D‖  (lowest  quality)  from  Heston,  Summers,  and  Aten.
6  Many  small  economies,  for  which 
international trade is important, have implausibly high historical levels of income, which is typically due to 
questionable national accounts deflators, particularly for the foreign sector. Therefore, we also omit small 
economies. This sample-selection procedure yields a sample of 75 countries. 
 
3.2. Panel unit-root tests  
To ensure that the failure to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root is not simply due to the low 
power inherent in the individual country unit-root tests, we compute the panel unit-root test developed by Im, 
Pesaran, and Shin (2003) (IPS). This allows us to test the null hypothesis that all of the individuals of the 
panel have a unit root, against the alternative that some fractions are (trend) stationary. The IPS test is based 
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1 ' ,                                                                                                 (3) 
where pi is the lag order and zit represents deterministic terms, such as fixed effects or fixed effects combined 
with individual time trends. In model (3), the unit root null hypothesis,  0 : 0  i H  ,  i  =1, 2, …, N, is tested 
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where  NT t  is the average of the N (=75) cross-sectional ADF t-statistics, and μ and ν are, respectively, the 
mean and variance of the average of the individual t-statistics, tabulated by Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003).  
However, the standard IPS test can lead to spurious inferences if the errors, εit, are not independent 
across i. Therefore, we also employ the cross-sectionally augmented IPS test proposed by Pesaran (2007), 
which is designed to filter out the cross-sectional dependency by augmenting the ADF regression with the 
cross-sectional averages of lagged levels and first differences of the individual series. Accordingly, the cross-
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where  t x  is the cross-sectional mean of xit,  t x  =   
 N
i it x N
1
1 . The cross-sectionally augmented IPS statistic 
is the simple average of the individual CADF statistics: 
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6 Our sample excludes 13 countries, the data for which receive a grade of ―D‖ (and/or which had populations in the 
period 1960-2003 of less than one million) and 9 countries for which the time series did not pass the unit-root tests. The 
9   
where  i t  is the OLS t-ratio of  i   in Eq. (5). Critical values are tabulated by Pesaran (2007). 
The test results for the variables in levels and in first differences are presented in Table 2. As can be 
seen, both the IPS and the CIPS test statistics are unable to reject the hypothesis that all countries have a unit 
root in levels. Since the unit root hypothesis can be rejected for the first differences, we conclude that  ) ln( it Y  
and  ) ln( it T  are integrated of order 1, I(1). Thus, the next  step in our analysis is an investigation of the 
cointegration properties of the variables. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
3.3. Cointegration tests 
We first test for cointegration using the Larsson et al. (2001) approach, which is based on Johansen’s 
(1988) full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation technique. Like the Johansen time-series 
cointegration test, the Larsson et al. panel test treats all variables as potentially  endogenous, thus avoiding 
the normalization problems inherent to residual-based cointegration tests. It involves estimating the Johansen 
vector error correction model for each country separately, and then computing the individual trace statistics 
} ) ( ) ( { p H r H LRiT ,  which allows us to account for heterogeneous cointegrating vectors across countries. The 
null hypothesis is that all countries have the same number of cointegrating vectors ri among the p variables 
r r rank H i i    ) ( : 0 , and the alternative hypothesis is  p rank H i   ) ( : 1 , for all  N i , ... , 1  , where  i  is 
the long-run matrix of order p×p. To test  0 H  against  1 H , a panel cointegration rank trace test is constructed 
by calculating the average of the N individual trace statistics, 
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and then standardizing it as follows:  
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  ,                                                       (8)  
where the mean  ) ( k Z E and variance  ) ( k Z Var  of the asymptotic trace statistic are tabulated by Breitung 
(2005) for the model we use (the model with a constant and a trend in the cointegrating relationship). As 
shown by Larsson et al. (2001), the standardized panel trace statistic has an asymptotic standard normal 
distribution as N and T → ∞. 




i p ) log( 2  ,                                                                                                                               (9) 
where pi is the p-value of the trace statistic for country i, calculated from the response surface estimates in 
MacKinnon et al. (1999). The Fisher statistic is distributed as ˇ
2 with 2×N degrees of freedom. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
finding that in most, but not all, countries, both GDP per worker and trade openness exhibit a unit root is in line with 
previous studies (see, e.g., McCoskey, 2002). 
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However, these test procedures do not take account of potential error cross-sectional dependence, 
which could bias the results. To test for cointegration in the presence of possible cross-sectional dependence 
we follow Holly et al. (2010) and adopt a residual-based two-step approach in the style of Pedroni (1999, 
2004). But unlike Pedroni, we use the common correlated effects (CCE) estimation procedure developed by 
Pesaran  (2006)  in  the  first-step  regression.  This  procedure  allows  for  cross-sectional  dependencies  that 
potentially arise from multiple unobserved common factors by including the cross-sectional averages of the 
dependent variable and the observed regressors as proxies for the unobserved factors. Accordingly, the cross-
sectionally augmented cointegrating regression we estimate for each country is given by:  
it t i t i it i i i it e Y g T g T t a Y       ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( 1 0   ,                                                                     (10) 
where  ) ln( t T and  ) ln( t Y are the cross-sectional averages of  ) ln( it T  and  ) ln( it Y in year t. In the second step, we 
compute the cross-sectionally augmented IPS statistic for the residuals from the individual CCE long-run 
relations,  ) ln( ˆ ˆ ) ln( ˆ it it i it it T t Y       ,  including  an  intercept.  This  allows  us  to  account  for  unobserved 
common factors that could be correlated with the observed regressors in both steps. If the presence of a unit 
root in  it  ˆ  can be rejected, we can conclude that there is a cointegrating relationship between trade and 
income. 
The results of these tests are presented in Table 3. For completeness, we also report the standard 
panel and group ADF test statistics suggested by Pedroni (1999, 2004). As can be seen, all tests strongly 
suggest that  ) ln( it Y  and  ) ln( it T  are cointegrated. The standardized trace statistics and the Fisher ˇ
2 statistics 
clearly support the presence of one cointegrating vector. Also, the CIPS, the panel ADF and the group ADF 
statistics reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the one-percent level, implying that there exists a 
long-run relationship between trade and income.   
[Table 3 about here] 
 
3.4. The long-run relationship between trade and income  
Having found that trade and income are cointegrated, the next step in our analysis is to determine the 
magnitude of the long-run impact of international trade on income. To this end, we estimate the coefficient 
  in Eq. (2) using the between-dimension, group-mean panel DOLS estimator suggested by Pedroni (2001). 
Pedroni emphasizes several advantages of using between-dimension group-mean-based estimators over the 
within-dimension  approach.  For  example,  it  is  argued  that  the  between-dimension  estimator  allows  for 
greater  flexibility  in  the  presence  of  heterogeneous  cointegrating  vectors,  whereas  under  the  within-
dimension approach, the cointegrating vectors are constrained to be the same for each country. Clearly, this 
is an important advantage for applications such as the present one, because there is no reason to assume that 
the effect of trade on income is the same across countries. Another advantage of the between-dimension 
estimators  is  that  the  point  estimates  provide  a  more  useful  interpretation  in  the  case  of  heterogeneous 
cointegrating vectors, since they can be interpreted as the mean value of the cointegrating vectors, which 
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does not apply to the within estimators. And finally, the between-dimension estimators suffer from much 
lower small-sample-size distortions than is the case with the within-dimension estimators. 
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where Φij are coefficients  of lead and  lag  differences, which account for possible serial  correlation and 
endogeneity  of the regressor(s), thus yielding unbiased  estimates.  Therefore, an important feature of the 
DOLS procedure is that it generates unbiased estimates for variables that cointegrate, even with endogenous 
regressors.  Consequently,  in  contrast  to  conventional  cross-country  approaches,  the  approach  does  not 
require exogeneity assumptions nor does it require the use of instruments. In addition, the DOLS estimator is 
superconsistent under cointegration, and it is also robust to the omission of variables that do not form part of 
the cointegrating relationship.  
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where  it z  is the  1 ) 1 ( 2   K  vector of regressors  it z  = ( ) (ln( it T  –  , ) ln( i T ), ln( K it T    …,  ) ln( K it T   ),  it s ~ = 
i it s s  , and the subscript 1 outside the brackets indicates that only the first element of the vector is taken to 
obtain the pooled slope coefficient. Because the expression following the summation over the i is identical to 
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is the associated t-statistic and  i  ˆ  is the conventional DOLS estimator applied to 
the ith country of the panel. As found by Stock and Watson (1993), this estimator performs well in short time 
series compared to other cointegration estimators, such the FIML estimator of Johansen (1988) or the fully 
modified ordinary least squares (FMOLS) estimator of Phillips and Hansen (1990).  
We present the DOLS group-mean point estimate of the impact of international trade on income in 
the  second  column  of  Table  4.  As  expected,  the  regression  shows  a  statistically  significant  relationship 
between trade and income. The t-statistic on  ) ln( it T  is 6.38 and the point estimate implies that an increase in 
the trade/GDP ratio by one percent increases GDP per worker by 0.181 percent, on average. An important 
aspect of this result is that the point estimate is much smaller than most cross-country regression estimates, 
which tend to yield unreasonably large values for the impact of trade on income (as discussed in Section 
2.2). We thus obtain a more reliable estimate of the impact of trade on income despite the fact that our panel 
regression does not include direct proxies for geographical and institutional characteristics and despite the 
endogeneity of trade. This is due to the fact that in our panel model, any effects of unobserved or omitted 
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variables are captured by the deterministic fixed effects and heterogeneous time trends, as well as the fact 
that  the  group-mean  DOLS  estimator  is  robust  to  both  the  presence  of  endogenous  regressors  and  the 
presence of heterogeneity in the effects of trade on income across countries. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Nevertheless, we have to admit that the estimated impact of trade may be biased by the presence of 
potential cross-sectional dependencies.
7 To evaluate this issue, the third column of Table 4 reports the result 
of  the  common  correlated  effects  mean  group  estimator  (CCEMG)  suggested  by  Pesaran  (2006).  This 
estimator is the simple average of the individual CCE estimators given by Eq. (10). As can be seen, the 
CCEMG  estimator  and  the  group-mean  DOLS  estimator  produce  similar  results,  suggesting  that  cross-
sectional dependence is not a serious problem. Admittedly, the CCEMG estimate is somewhat lower than its 
DOLS counterpart. However, the CCEMG estimation procedure implicitly assumes that the cointegration 
between trade and income is driven by a stochastic trend that is common to all countries of the panel, which 
may be incorrect. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the CCEMG estimator is intended for the case in 
which the regressors are exogenous, so that we lose the ability to account for the likely endogeneity of trade. 
Therefore, we prefer the DOLS estimate in column two.  
Since a main contribution of this paper is the use of estimation techniques that are robust (under 
cointegration)  to  a  variety  of  estimation  problems  that  often  plague  empirical  work,  including  omitted 
variables, endogeneity, and heterogeneity, we need to ensure that the differences in the estimates between 
this and previous studies are due exclusively to the estimation method, rather than to other factors, such as 
outliers, sample selection, and different data sets. 
To examine whether outliers are responsible for the smaller estimated effect of trade on income, we 
re-estimate  the  DOLS  regression,  excluding  one  country  at  a  time  from  the  sample.  The  sequentially 
estimated group-mean coefficients and their t-statistics are presented in Fig. 1. As they are relatively stable 
between 0.15 and 0.20 and always significant at the one-percent level, we conclude that the relatively small 
cross-country effect is not the result of potential outliers. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Next,  we  examine  whether  the  relatively  small  estimate  of     is  due  to  sample-selection  bias. 
Sample-selection bias occurs when the selected sample is not random and thus not representative. A potential 
problem with our sample could be that we excluded 13 countries with data quality of grade ―D‖ (and also 
with populations of less than one million) and nine countries having time series which did not pass the ADF 
test, the PP test, or the KPSS test. However, given that these tests may suffer from severe size distortions 
(implying that there could be a significant unit-root component that has not been detected by these tests), and 
that these 22 excluded countries could have a significant effect on the results, we re-estimate the DOLS 
regression for the whole sample of 97 countries. The resulting group-mean coefficient is given in the second 
                                                        
7  The  cross-section  dependence  test  suggested  by  Pesaran  (2004)  rejects  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  cross-section 
dependence at the one-percent level. 
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column of Table 5. As can be seen, this coefficient is even somewhat smaller than that of the original sample 
and still statistically significant at the one-percent level, suggesting that our relatively small estimate of the 
cross-country effect of trade on income is not the result of sample-selection bias. 
Finally, we investigate whether the discrepancies in the results between the present and previous 
studies are due to the use of different data sets. Most previous studies, including Frankel and Romer (1999), 
Dollar and Kraay (2003), and Alcalá and Ciccone (2004), are based on data from the Penn World Table 
(PWT), Version 5.6, whereas we use the PWT Version 6.2. However, it has recently been shown that some 
country data differ significantly between different versions of the PWT and that, therefore, conclusions based 
on one version of the PWT do not necessarily hold under another version (see, e.g., Johnson et al., 2009; 
Ponomareva and Katayama, 2010). In light of this finding, we re-run the DOLS regression with data from 
the PWT 5.6. The sample, in this case, consists of 68 countries over the period from 1955 to 1990. As the 
result in column three of Table 5 shows, the trade coefficient is slightly greater than its counterpart in Table 
4, but still much smaller than the coefficients reported in previous studies. Thus, the differences in the results 
appear to not be due to the use of different versions of the PWT. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The individual country DOLS point estimates (for the original sample and data source) and their         
t-statistics are presented in Table 6. The most striking feature of these estimates is the heterogeneity in the 
slope coefficients, ranging from -1.0723 (Ecuador) to 2.1883 (Denmark). Accordingly, there are large cross-
country differences in the impact of international trade on income that are not captured in standard cross-
country and panel regressions. Moreover, while most studies obtain a positive coefficient on trade openness, 
we find that for 29 out of 75 countries, an increase in trade is associated with a decrease in income per 
worker. Thus, a substantial portion of countries do not gain from trade. Interestingly, all of these countries 
are developing countries, whereas for developed countries, the estimated trade coefficient is unanimously 
positive. To make the differences between developed and developing countries more obvious, we report the 
DOLS group-mean estimates for these two country groupings in the bottom row of Table 6. The estimated 
effect  of  trade  is  statistically  significant  and  positive  for  developed  and  significant  and  negative  for 
developing  countries,  reflecting  the  heterogeneity  between  these  groups.
8  But  even  within  the  group  of 
developing countries, the individual country estimates show considerable heterogeneity. For example, the 
point estimates suggest that Uruguay, Chile, and Indonesia benefit significantly from trade. In contrast, for 
other countries, such as Nigeria and Burkina Faso, the positive trade effects are marginal, whereas in many 
countries, such as Ecuador, Panama, and Paraguay, trade has a strong negative effect on income. 
[Table 6 about here] 
Given that the impact of trade  on income  is not constant across countries,  we ask whether it is 
constant over time. To answer this question, we compute for each country-DOLS regression the MeanF  test 
developed  by  Hansen  (1992).  This  test  is  a  Chow-type  test  for  parameter  constancy  in  cointegrating 
                                                        
8 Similarly, DeJong and Ripoll (2006) find that the effects of tariffs on growth are negative for rich countries, but 
positive for poor countries. 
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regressions with unknown change points and is designed to detect any gradual changes in the regression 
coefficients.
9 The results of this test are reported in the columns 4 and 8 of Table 6. They show that the null 
hypothesis of parameter stability is rejected at least at the five-percent level in about 35 percent of cases, 
suggesting that in several countries, the impact of trade on income has changed over time. Interestingly, most 
of them (about 85 percent) are developing countries, which fact is also reflected  in the average MeanF 
statistics presented in the bottom row of Table 6. For developed countries as a whole, the average MeanF 
statistic  implies  a  fairly  stable  relationship  between  trade  and  income.  In  contrast,  the  average  MeanF 
statistic suggests that in developing countries, the trade-income relationship tends to be rather unstable. A 
possible explanation for this finding is that the impact of trade on income depends on several political and 
institutional  factors  that  are  often  not  constant,  especially  in  developing  countries.  For  example,  many 
developing countries underwent significant changes in institutions and regulation between 1960 and 2003, 
going from dictatorships to democracies and from extremely market-unfriendly to market-friendly policies. 
If policies and institutions affecting the trade-income relationship change over time, then the effect of trade 
on income changes over time, as well. The hypothesis that the income effect of trade depends on several 
country-specific factors is examined in detail in Section 4. Before examining this issue, we finally test the 
direction of causality.  
 
3.5. Long-run causality 
Even  though  estimation  by  DOLS  does  not  require  the  regressor(s)  to  be  exogenous  (and  even 
though  cointegration  implies  long-run  Granger  causality  in  at  least  one  direction),  we  are  interested  in 
detecting the direction of long-run causality. Specifically, given that the volume of trade generally tends to 
increase  with  the  level  of  income  (as  discussed  in  Section  2.1.),  it  is  likely  that  causality  runs  in  both 
directions, that is, not only from trade to income but also from income to trade. To test the direction of long-
run causality, we enter the residuals from the individual DOLS long-run relations,  
)] ln( ˆ ˆ ˆ [ ) ln( it i i i it it T t a Y ec       ,                                                                                                     (14)            











































































,                                                                 (15) 
where the cis are fixed effects, the error-correction term,  1  it ec , represents the error in, or deviation from, the 
equilibrium, and the adjustment coefficients  1 a  and  2 a  capture how  ) ln( it Y  and  ) ln( it T  respond to deviations 
from the equilibrium relationship. From the Granger representation theorem, we know that at least one of the 
adjustment  coefficients  must  be  non-zero  if  a  long-run  relationship  between  the  variables  is  to  hold.  A 
significant error-correction term also suggests long-run Granger causality and thus long-run  endogeneity 
                                                        
9 Hansen (1992) develops the stability tests using the FMOLS estimator. Because the DOLS estimator is asymptotically 
equivalent to the FMOLS  estimator, the test statistics have the same distributions and are thus applicable to  both 
estimators. 
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(see, e.g., Hall and Milne, 1994), whereas a non-significant adjustment coefficient implies long-run Granger 
non-causality from the independent to the dependent variable(s), as well as weak exogeneity. Following 
Herzer  (2008),  we  test  for  weak  exogeneity  by  first  imposing  zero  restrictions  on  the  statistically 
insignificant  short-run  parameters  (Гj)  and  then  using  a  conventional  likelihood  ratio  test  of  the  null 
hypothesis a1,2 = 0.  
Model (15) allows for heterogeneous long-run relationships, but assumes homogeneous short-run 
dynamics and homogeneous adjustment coefficients. Because, however, this homogeneity assumption may 
be empirically incorrect, we also allow for complete heterogeneity by estimating the VECM separately for 
each country. More specifically, we eliminate the insignificant short-run parameters from the VECM and 
compute the p-values for testing the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity for each country, individually. The 
panel weak exogeneity test is then conducted using the Fisher statistic given by Eq. (9).  
[Table 7 about here] 
Table 7 presents the results. As can be seen, both the standard Wald statistic and the Fisher statistic 
reject the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity for both  ) ln( it Y  and  ) ln( it T  at the one-percent significance 
level. From this it can be concluded that the statistical long-run causality is bidirectional, suggesting that 
increased trade is both a consequence and a cause of increased income, as expected.  
 
4. The determinants of the impact of trade on income 
In the previous section, we found considerable differences in the impact of trade on income across 
countries. This section systematically searches for country-specific conditions that are important factors in 
explaining these differences; that is, we try to identify important determinants of the income effect of trade. 
These  determinants  have  hardly  been  investigated  to  date. However,  two  exceptions  are  the  studies  by 
Bormann et al. (2006), and Freund and Bolaky (2008), which find that the effect of trade on income is 
negatively related to the level of regulation, whereas there is no robust association between the income effect 
of trade and  institutional  quality  in terms  of  good  governance.
10 Both studies use cross-country  income 
regressions that include interaction terms between trade and a small number of potential determinants of the 
income effect of trade.
11 In this section, we follow a different approach: We use a regression model with the 
estimated income effect as dependent variable to consider a large number of possible determinants of the 
trade-income relationship. Because we use the income effect of trade, rather than income as the dependent 
variable, and because we include as many variables as possible relevant to the income effect of trade, our 
approach  is less subject to  endogeneity and  omitted-variable bias than the conventional interaction-term 
approach used by Bormann et al., and Freund and Bolaky. Finally, it should be noted that, in contrast to our 
approach, the conventional interaction-term approach is unable to identify which variable determines the 
                                                        
10 Bormann et al. (2006) define institutional quality in terms of good governance (as usual) and government regulations, 
and find insignificant effects of the former and significant effects of the latter. 
11 Bormann et al. (2006) and Freund and Bolaky (2008) find that trade per se does not exert a robust effect on income, 
but that trade has positive effects  on income  only if the level of  business and labor regulation is below a certain 
threshold. 
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effect  of  the  other  variable.  For  example,  a  statistically  significant  interaction  term  between  trade  and 
regulation does not necessarily imply that the income effect of trade depends on the level of regulation; it can 
instead be compatible with the possibility that the effect of regulation on income is determined by the level 
of trade openness. 
We  proceed  in  our  analysis  by  first  describing  the  variables  that  we  consider  to  be  potentially 
relevant to the trade-income relationship and which we use in the empirical analysis, and then presenting the 
empirical analysis, and discussing the results. 
 
4.1. Variables and data  
The first three variables that we consider are the general level of development, human capital, and 
the level of development of local financial markets. The reason why these variables might be important for 
explaining cross-country differences in the income effect of trade can be intuitively explained as follows: An 
important source of gains from trade is the existence of cross-border knowledge spillovers. The ability to 
absorb foreign knowledge and technology depends, however, on absorptive capacity, which, in turn, is linked 
to the general level of development. Accordingly, low developed countries using very backward production 
technology may be unable to make effective use of technology spillovers. In a similar way, it can be argued 
that a certain level of human capital may be necessary for the adoption of foreign technology. And finally, 
knowledge spillovers are typically realized only if importers, exporters, and domestic producers have the 
ability to invest in absorbing foreign knowledge, which may be restricted by underdeveloped local financial 
markets.  
Thus,  it  can  be  hypothesized  that  the  income  effect  of  trade  depends  upon  the  general  level  of 
development, the level of human capital, and the level of financial market development. In our analysis, the 
general level of development is represented by real per-capita GDP, the secondary school enrollment rate is 
used as a proxy for human capital, and the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP is our 
measure of financial development. All these measures are taken from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI).  
Furthermore, we consider primary export dependence to be a possible factor explaining the cross-
country differences in the income effect of trade. Several authors hypothesize that primary exports may be an 
obstacle to attaining a higher standard of living. The main arguments advanced in support of this hypothesis 
are threefold (see,  e.g., Sachs and  Warner, 1995; Herzer, 2007):  (i)  increased primary  exports can  lead 
economies to shift away from the competitive manufacturing sectors in which many externalities necessary 
for growth are generated, while the primary export sector itself does not (by its nature) have many linkages 
with, and spillovers into, the economy (Helpman and Krugman (1985), for example, show that if opening up 
to trade induces an expansion of sectors that do not exhibit positive externalities, while other sectors with 
positive externalities shrink, trade can lead to welfare losses); (ii) revenues from primary product exports 
often only accrue to a few wealthy individuals and thus tend to be wasted through profligate or inappropriate 
consumption, rather than invested in productive activities; and (iii) primary exports are subject to large price 
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and volume fluctuations. Increased primary exports may therefore lead to increased GDP variability and 
macroeconomic  uncertainty.  High  instability  and  uncertainty  may,  in  turn,  hamper  efforts  at  economic 
planning  and  reduce  the  quantity,  as  well  as  efficiency,  of  investment.  Accordingly,  a  possible  factor 
explaining the cross-country variations in the income effect of trade is primary export dependence. We use 
the ratio of primary exports to GDP from the WDI as measure of primary export dependence.  
Next, we consider the possibility that the income effect of trade depends on the level of regulation, as 
suggested by Bormann et al. (2006) and Freund and Bolaky (2008). The logic behind this is simple:  In 
standard theory, gains from trade arise from a reallocation of resources from import-competing sectors to 
specific export sectors in which a country has a comparative advantage, implying a contraction in the activity 
of the former and an expansion of the latter. Government regulations, however, may impede the reallocation 
of  resources  to  comparative-advantage  sectors,  thereby  reducing  the  gains  from  trade.  In  fact,  several 
theoretical  models  suggest  that  in  a  scenario  of  severe  factor-market  imperfections  that  limit  both  the 
mobility of factors between sectors and the flexibility of factor prices, increased trade may be associated with 
unemployment or underemployment and, as a consequence, with income losses (see, e.g., Haberler, 1950; 
Edwards, 1988; Krishna and Yavas, 2005; Chang et al., 2009). We examine three forms of regulation: labor 
regulation, business regulation, and price regulation. 
  Labor regulation is measured by the flexibility-of-firing index from the World Bank’s ―Doing Business‖ 
database (World Bank 2004). The higher the index, the more a country regulates the process of firing 
employed labor and thus the movement of labor across sectors. 
  Business  regulation  is  represented  by  the  business  freedom  index  published  by  The  Heritage 
Foundation.
12 The business-freedom index assesses the ability to create, operate, and close an enterprise 
quickly and easily. The higher the index, the lower the level of business regulation, and thus the higher 
the potential to reallocate factors of production between sectors. 
  Price regulation is measured by The Heritage Foundation’s monetary-freedom index, which combines an 
assessment price controls with a measure of price stability. We use this combined index because both 
price controls and inflation may hinder the efficient allocation of resources, according to comparative 
advantage; the higher the index, the lower the levels of price controls and inflation. 
We also include two infrastructure variables from the WDI in the analysis: the total length of railway 
lines per square kilometer of land area and telephone mainlines per 1,000 people. The idea behind this is that 
gains from trade depend on the potential of the trade sector to generate linkages with the rest of the economy, 
which in turn may depend on the level of infrastructure development.  
And finally, we hypothesize that the income effect of trade depends on the quality of institutions. 
Institutions, such as property rights, lower transaction costs by reducing uncertainty and establishing a stable 
structure to facilitate interactions, thus helping to allocate resources to their most efficient uses. Without 
institutions, individuals  do  not  have  incentives to  invest  in physical  or human  capital  or  to adopt  more 
                                                        
12 See http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/downloads.cfm. 
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efficient  technologies,  implying  that  resources  are  misallocated  and  potential  gains  from  trade  go 
unexploited.  In  addition,  recent  studies  argue  that  institutions  are  a  source  of  comparative  advantage. 
Desroches and Francis (2006), for example, develop a theoretical model in which countries that have good 
institutions  will  tend  to  export  relatively  more  capital-intensive  (or  sophisticated)  goods  compared  to 
countries that have poor institutions. In their  model, trade  magnifies the  impact  of  weak institutions on 
income, leading to greater income divergence than if countries remained in autarky. Similarly, Levchenko 
(2007) shows that when institutions are the source of comparative advantage, countries with good institutions 
gain the most from trade, while countries with bad institutions may lose as a result of trade. For the empirical 
analysis, we use nine measures of institutional (or governance) quality. Our first measure is the property- 
rights  index  published  by  The  Heritage  Foundation.  This  index  assesses  the  ability  of  individuals  to 
accumulate private property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the government. The remaining 
eight measures are compiled from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), published by the Political 
Risk Services (PRS) Group.
13 They are defined as follows:   
  Corruption––this index assesses the level of corruption within the political system. 
  Government stability––this factor measures the government’s ability to carry out its declared program(s) 
and its ability to stay in office. 
  Bureaucratic quality––this is an assessment of the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy in 
terms of acting as a shock absorber to minimize revisions of policy when governments change.  
  Investment  profile––this  measure  assesses  the  factors  affecting  the  risk  to  investment  that  are  not 
covered by other political, economic, or financial risk components, such as contract viability or payment 
delays. 
  Socioeconomic conditions––this index quantifies socioeconomic pressures at work in society that could 
constrain government action or fuel social dissatisfaction and thus destabilize the political regime. 
  Democratic accountability––this is an assessment of the responsiveness of the government to its citizens. 
  Internal conflict––the internal conflict measure is an assessment of political violence within a country 
(such as civil war, terrorism, or civil disorder) and its actual or potential impact on governance. 
  External conflict––the external conflict measure assesses the risk to the incumbent government from 
foreign action, ranging from non-violent external pressure to violent external pressure. 
It is important to note that the indicators for corruption and external and internal conflict are rescaled so that 
higher values always reflect higher institutional quality.  
The  variables,  their  definitions,  and  sources  are  listed  in  Table  8.  All  variables  are  used  in 
logarithmic form except for the dependent variable. The dependent variable is the estimated effect of trade 
on income from Table 6,  i  ˆ . As discussed in Section 3.4, this effect can be assumed to be time-constant in 
65 percent of the countries in our sample and can thus be treated as the average impact per year. For the 
remaining 35 percent of the countries, we found that the estimated income effect of trade is indeed not 
                                                        
13 See https://www.prsgroup.com/prsgroup_shoppingcart/pc-75-7-icrg-historical-data.aspx 
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constant; nevertheless, it can be roughly interpreted as a time average over the period  of 1960 to 2003. 
Consequently, we also use time averages for the independent variables for that period. An exception is the 
flexibility-of-firing index for which data before 2003 are not available, so that we are constrained to use 
values for that single year. Moreover, we do not have complete data on all variables for all countries, forcing 
us to limit our sample to 62 countries. The country composition of the sample is given in the Appendix. 
  
4.2. Empirical analysis   
We start with bivariate regressions of the estimated income effect of trade on the above variables. 
The results of these regressions are reported in Table 9. They show that, without exception, all coefficients 
are statistically significant and have the expected signs. From this it follows that, as expected, each variable 
could  act  as  an  important  determinant  of  the  trade-income  relationship.  Moreover,  the  fact  that  all 
coefficients are significant with the correct sign implies that the individual country estimates of the effect of 
international trade on income (reported in Table 6) are fairly accurate. By definition, bivariate cross-sectional 
regressions are, however, unable to identify which of the variables are really important––that is, robust to the 
inclusion of other potentially relevant factors.
14 To determine which of the variables are important (or most 
important) in explaining the cross-country variations in the effect of trade on income, we use the general-to-
specific model-selection approach suggested by Hoover and Perez (2004). The general-to-specific approach 
is adopted here because a comprehensive theory to explain the cross-country variations in the income effect 
of trade does not exist. Admittedly, a criticism of the uses of a general-to-specific modeling approach is that 
sequential test procedures using conventional critical values may understate the true size of the joint test 
implicit in the search procedure. Hoover and Perez, however, argue that this applies only to undisciplined or 
wrongly disciplined data mining but not to a disciplined search procedure. More specifically, they show that 
their particular general-to-specific procedure has both a near-nominal size and high power and is therefore 
very effective in identifying the true parameters of the data-generating process. In addition, they demonstrate 
that their approach outperforms other variable-selection procedures, such as the extreme-bounds approaches 
of Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997). 
[Table 9 about here] 
Following the Hoover and Perez (2004) approach, we start by estimating a general specification, in 
which all variables are included, and subject the estimated model to a series of specification tests. The test 
battery includes a Jarque-Bera test (JB) for normality of the residuals, a Ramsey RESET test for general 
nonlinearity  and  functional  form  misspecification  (RESET),  a  Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey  test  for 
heteroscedasticity (HET),
15 and a sub-sample stability test (STABILITY) using an F-test for the equality of the 
                                                        
14 This does not necessarily apply to (panel) cointegration estimators (such as the one used in Section 3.4), which are 
robust to the omission of variables that do not form part of the cointegrating relationship. 
15 Since an estimated dependent variable may introduce heteroscedasticity into the regressions (see, e.g., Saxonhouse, 
1976), it is particularly important to test for heteroscedasticity. An alternative is to use White’s heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors. Because our models are free from heteroscedasticity, the use of White’s standard errors does 
not change the significance levels. Results are available on request. 
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variances of the first three-fourths versus the last one-fourth of the sample. The results of these tests are 
presented in the top part of Table 10. They show clear evidence of non-normality and misspecification. 
[Table 10 about here] 
However, we find that Denmark, Greece, and the Netherlands produce large outliers in the residuals. 
Therefore,  we  introduce  dummy  variables  for  these  countries  to  obtain  a  well-specified  equation.  The 
diagnostic test statistics are presented at the bottom of Table 10. They suggest that the model is now well 
specified. The assumption of normally distributed residuals cannot be rejected, and the RESET test does not 
suggest  nonlinearity  or  misspecification.  The  model  also  passes  the  Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey  test  for 
heteroscedasticity and the F-test for parameter stability. 
Next, we use the general model (with country dummies) and simplify it by removing insignificant 
variables. To this end, the variables are first ranked according to their t-statistics. We then employ five 
simplification paths in which each of the five variables with the lowest t-statistics is the first to be removed, 
yielding five equations. From these equations, variables with insignificant coefficients are then eliminated 
sequentially according to the lowest t-values until the remaining variables are significant at the five-percent 
level. After removal of each variable, the above tests of model adequacy are performed. Furthermore, an F-
test of the hypothesis that the current specification is a valid restriction of the general specification is used 
after each step. In our case, all of these tests are passed, implying five well-specified parsimonious equations, 
all of which are valid restrictions of the general model. Finally, we construct the non-redundant joint model 
from each of these equations by taking all specifications and performing the  F-test for encompassing the 
other specifications. This procedure yields the final specification in Table 11. As can be seen, the final model 
passes all of the diagnostic tests. Moreover, in Fig. 2, CUSUM and CUSUM of square tests are presented, 
which unanimously support a stable model for the countries involved. Thus, statistically valid inferences can 
be drawn from the regression results in Table 11. 
[Table 11 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
The results imply that the cross-country variations in the income effect of trade can be explained 
mainly, or most directly, by cross-country differences in the level of primary export dependence (measured 
by the share of primary exports in GDP), the level of labor market regulation (measured by the flexibility-of-
firing index), and property rights. According to the estimated coefficients, a one-percent increase in the share 
of primary exports in GDP is associated with a 0.156 percentage-point decrease in the income effect of trade, 
and each extra percent of labor regulation is estimated to reduce the impact of trade on income by 0.295 
percentage points, whereas an increase in the property rights index by one percent raises the effect of trade 
on income by 0.464 percentage points. 
Note  that  this  finding  can  also  explain  why  the  income  effect  of  trade  is,  perhaps  surprisingly, 
negative in many countries, such as Malaysia, Mexico, and China (see Table 6): According to our data, 
Malaysia  is  heavily  dependent  upon  primary  commodity  exports,  Mexico  is  subject  to  excessive  labor 
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regulations  (measured  by  the  flexibility-of-firing  index),  and  the  level  of  property  rights  protection  is 
extremely low in China.  
On  the  other  hand,  the  coefficients  on  the  country  dummies  for  Denmark,  Greece,  and  the 
Netherlands are positive and large in magnitude, indicating that trade has strong positive effects on income in 
these  countries  (see  also  Table  6).  Given,  however,  that  the  dummy  variables  reflect  country-specific 
characteristics that are not captured by any of the variables involved, we admit that the estimated models do 
not provide a complete picture of the potential determinants of the cross-country differences in the income 
effect of trade. 
Table 12 provides some information about the performance of the variables that are omitted from the 
final  specification.  The  second  column  reports  the  t-statistic  of  each  omitted  variable  when  added 
individually to the regression in Table 11, while the last three columns give an indication of the extent to 
which  the  omitted  variables  are  collinear  with  the  regressors  of  the  final  model,  showing  the  pair-wise 
correlation  coefficients  and  their  t-statistics.  When  added  individually  to  the  final  model,  all  omitted 
variables are insignificant, and several, such as per-capita GDP, secondary schooling, and business freedom, 
also have the wrong sign. This is in contrast to the bivariate regression results in Table 9 (where all variables 
are correctly signed) and suggests a high degree of collinearity. Thus, it can be assumed that several of the 
omitted variables are highly correlated with the variables in the final model, in turn implying that some of the 
excluded variables might play an important indirect role in the trade-income relationship by affecting the 
included  variables  or  being  affected  by  them.  In  fact,  the  pair-wise  correlation  coefficients  show  that 
regulations on firing workers are highly significantly (at the one-percent level) correlated with many of the 
omitted variables: GDP per capita, schooling, business freedom, rail lines, telephone mainlines, corruption, 
bureaucratic  quality,  investment  profile,  socioeconomic  conditions,  the  level  of  democracy,  and  internal 
conflict. Similarly, property rights have highly significant correlations with all  of the excluded variables 
except external conflict, while the share of primary exports in GDP is significantly correlated only with GDP 
per capita. 
[Table 12 about here] 
In Table 13, we present regressions of the income effect of trade on the most significant correlates of 
the variables of the final model (those which are significant at the one-percent level for at least two of the 
three variables). To avoid collinearity problems, we included  only the primary export share as a control 
variable,  since  ln(primaryexports)  is  the  only  variable  of  the  final  specification  that  is  not  significantly 
correlated with most of the omitted variables. In contrast to Table 12, all variables are again significant at 
least at the five-percent level, with the exception of schooling and internal conflict, suggesting that these 
significant  variables,  namely  GDP  per  capita,  business  freedom,  physical  infrastructure,  corruption, 
bureaucratic quality, investment profile, socioeconomic conditions, democracy, and internal conflict, do in 
fact play an important indirect role in the long-run relationship between trade and income. 
[Table 13 about here] 
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Overall, these results are consistent with the finding in Section 3.4 that trade has, on average, a 
negative long-run effect on income in developing countries. The GDP per-capita variable was positive and 
statistically significant in several specifications, indicating that the income effect of trade tends to increase as 
the level of development increases. Of course, this does not necessarily explain the average negative effect 
for developing countries, but it at least shows that there are significant differences in the income effects of 
trade between developed and developing economies. To explain specifically why the long-run effect of trade 
on income is negative for most developing countries, and why the results of this section support this finding, 
it  is  useful  to  recall  that  our  final  specification  (in  Table  11)  does  not  include  per-capita  income.  As 
discussed above, this suggests that the  impact of trade  on income  is  not directly related to the  level  of 
development.  Rather,  the  level  of  development  appears  to  play  an  indirect  role  in  the  trade-income 
relationship by interacting with the included variables and their correlates. 
From this it follows that one key factor in the relationship between the level of development and the 
income  effect  of  trade  is  labor  regulation  and  its  association  with  related  variables,  such  as  business 
regulation and the investment profile. Since many developing countries are subject to high investment risks 
and excessive labor and business regulations (see, e.g., World Bank, 2009), and since such factor-market 
imperfections may severely limit both the mobility of factors between sectors and the flexibility of factor 
prices, trade can lead to welfare losses in these countries, as theory suggests. 
Another, and perhaps the most important, factor is the protection of property rights. This variable not 
only has the largest coefficient but is also highly correlated with almost all omitted variables, of which 
several  appear  to  have  important  indirect  effects  on  the  income  effect  of  trade.  Thus,  the  protection  of 
property rights captures a wide range of institutional factors that impact the income effect of trade, including 
investment  risks,  socioeconomic  conditions,  business  freedom,  democratic  accountability,  bureaucratic 
quality, and the level of corruption within the political system. Given that in many developing countries 
institutions are weak or non-existent, our findings are consistent with models suggesting that countries with 
weak institutions may lose from trade. 
Finally,  many  developing  countries  are  still  heavily  dependent  on  primary  commodity  exports. 
Several  of  them,  such  as  Mexico,  Venezuela,  Zambia,  and  Zimbabwe,  experienced  long  periods  of 
stagnation, or even decline. Our results suggest that the income effect of trade is negatively associated with 
primary export dependence (for the reasons discussed above), which may, at least in part, explain why some 
developing countries experience losses from trade. However, a word of caution is needed. It does not follow 
from this conclusion that there is a negative relationship between the income effect of trade and natural 
resource abundance. Many resource-abundant countries, such as Chile, India, Indonesia, Australia, Ireland, 
and Norway (all of which have positive coefficients on the trade variable), have diversified their exports in 
the past decades in order to reduce their dependence on primary product exports. Therefore, it seems unlikely 
that natural resource abundance per se is negatively related to the income effect of trade, although there 
might be a certain correlation between natural resource abundance and primary export dependence. 
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5. Conclusion 
We first examined the nature of the income effect of trade using panel cointegration techniques that 
are  specifically  designed  to  deal  with  the  key  problem  plaguing  previous  studies  of  the  trade-income 
relationship, namely, the inability to capture the heterogeneity in the relationship between trade and income 
across countries. Employing data for 75 developed and developing countries over the period or 1960 to 2003, 
we found that a one-percent increase in the trade share of GDP yields, on average, a statistically significant 
increase in income per worker of about 0.18 percent. This estimate is smaller than the findings reported by 
most  other  studies,  and  suggests  that  failure  to  account  for  cross-country  heterogeneity  can  lead  to 
misleading inferences about the average effect of trade on income. In fact, our results indicate that there are 
large cross-country differences in the income effect of trade, in particular between developed and developing 
countries; in developed countries the income effect of trade is positive, while in developing countries the 
income effect is negative, on average.   
Next, we used a general-to-specific model-selection approach to identify important country-specific 
factors explaining the cross-country differences in the income effect of trade. Our results suggest that these 
differences  can  be  explained  mainly,  or  most  directly,  by  cross-country  differences  in  primary  export 
dependence, labor market regulation, and property rights protection. However, it must be emphasized that 
there  are  several  factors,  such  as  GDP  per  capita,  business  regulations,  infrastructure,  corruption, 
bureaucratic quality, investment risk, socioeconomic conditions, democracy, and internal conflict, that are, 
on the one hand, highly correlated with the level of property rights protection, the level of labor regulation, 
and the degree of primary export dependence, and, on the other, also significantly associated with the income 
effect of trade in many specifications, suggesting that these factors play an important indirect role in the 
long-run relationship between trade and income. 
A final conclusion is that the negative effect of trade found for many developing countries need not 
remain negative; it can become positive over time when certain country-specific factors determining the 
effect of trade change. Specifically, reforms aimed at  
(i)  improving institutional quality, 
(ii)  increasing labor market flexibility, 
(iii)  minimizing the regulatory burden on business, and  
(iv)  removing primary export dependence by diversifying the economy 
can not only protect countries from the potential negative consequences of trade, but also help to exploit the 
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Appendix: Sample of countries used in the analysis of the determinants of the impact of trade on 
income 
Argentina  Finland  Madagascar  Portugal 
Australia  France  Malawi  Romania 
Austria  Greece  Malaysia  Senegal 
Belgium  Guatemala  Mexico  South Africa 
Brazil  Guinea  Morocco  Spain 
Burkina Faso  Honduras  Mozambique  Sri Lanka 
Cameroon  India  Netherlands  Sweden 
Canada  Indonesia  New Zealand  Switzerland 
Chile  Ireland  Nicaragua  Tanzania 
China  Israel  Nigeria  Thailand 
Colombia  Italy  Norway  United Kingdom 
Denmark  Jamaica  Pakistan  United States 
Dominican Republic  Japan  Panama  Uruguay 
Ecuador  Jordan  Paraguay  Venezuela 
El Salvador  Korea, Republic of  Peru  Zambia 
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Table 1 


















real     
Frankel and Romer 
(1999) 
ln(GDP per 
worker)  1.97 / 2.96      No  No 
Hall and Jones 
(1999) 
ln(GDP per 




capita)  1.97      No  No 
 
ln(GDP per 
capita)  0.21 / 0.34      Yes  No 
Frankel and Rose 
(2002) 
ln(GDP per 
capita)  1.59 / 1.96      No  No 
 
ln(GDP per 
capita)  1.13 / 1.28      Yes  No 
 
ln(GDP per 
capita)  0.68      Yes  Yes 
Irwin and Tervio 
(2002) 
ln(GDP per 
capita)  0.65 / 4.91      No  No 
 
ln(GDP per 
capita)  -7.19 / 1.30      Yes  No 
Dollar and Kraay 
(2003) 
ln(GDP per 
capita)      1.67  No  No 
 
ln(GDP per 
capita)      -3.40 / 0.18   No  Yes 
 
ln(GDP per 
capita)      -1.67 / 0.79  Yes  Yes 
Alcalá and Ciccone 
(2004) 
ln(GDP per 
worker)  0.394 / 1.013      Yes  Yes 
 
ln(GDP per 
worker)      1.002 / 1.482  Yes  Yes 
Rodrik et al.  
(2004) 
ln(GDP per 
capita)    -0.87 / 0.02    Yes  Yes 
 
ln(GDP per 
worker)    -0.42 / -0.30    Yes  Yes 
 
ln(GDP per 
capita)      -0.94 / -0.77  Yes  Yes 
Noguer and Siscard  
(2005) 
ln(GDP per 
capita)  2.59 / 2.96      No  No 
 
ln(GDP per 
capita)  0.89 / 1.22      Yes  No 
 
ln(GDP per 




capita)  -0.344      Yes  No 
Notes: Bold indicates that the estimated coefficients were found to be significant at least at the five-percent level. Only 
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Table 2 
Panel unit root tests.  
Variable  Deterministic terms
 
 
IPS statistics  CIPS statistics
 
 
Levels       
ln(Y)  c, t  0.023  -2.23 
ln(T)  c, t  -0.788  -2.20 
 
First differences 
     
Δln(Y)  c  -9.65**  -2.46** 
Δln(T)   c  -11.08**  -2.56** 
Notes: c (t) indicates that we allow for different intercepts (and time trends) for each country. Four lags were selected to 
adjust for autocorrelation. The IPS statistic is distributed as N(0, 1). The relevant five (one) percent critical value for the 
CIPS statistics is -2.58 (-2.68) with an intercept and a linear trend, and -2.10 (-2.20) with an intercept. ** denote 














Panel cointegration tests. 
  Cointegration rank 
  r = 0  r = 1 
Standardized panel trace statistics; } ) 2 ( ) ( { H r H LR    4.83**  -1.11 
Fisher statistics  219.0**  122.2 
CIPS statistic  -2.28** 
Panel ADF statistic  -3.62** 
Group ADF statistic  -2.91** 
Notes: The panel trace statistic, the panel ADF statistic, and the group ADF statistic are distributed as N(0, 1). The 
Fisher statistic is distributed as ˇ
2 with 2×N degrees of freedom. It has a critical value of 193.2 (179.6) at the one (five) 
percent level. The relevant five (one) percent critical value for the CIPS statistic is -2.10 (-2.20). One lag was used to 
form the panel trace statistic. For the panel ADF statistic, the group ADF statistic, and CIPS statistic, the number of lags 
was determined by the Schwarz criterion with a maximum of five lags. ** indicate a rejection of the null hypothesis of 
no cointegration at the one-percent level. 
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Table 4 
Estimates of the long-run impact of trade on income.  
Independent variable 
 
Group-mean DOLS estimator 
(Pedroni, 2001) 








Notes: The dependent variable is Ln(Y). t-statistics are in parenthesis. ** indicate significance at the one-percent level. 
The number of leads and lags in the individual DOLS regressions was determined by the Schwarz criterion with a 
























Estimates of the long-run impact of trade on income using different samples and data sets. 







Notes: The dependent variable is Ln(Y). t-statistics are in parenthesis. ** indicate significance at the one-percent level. 
There are 68 countries in the PWT 5.6 that have complete data on GDP per worker, nominal openness and the price 
level (GDP in exchange rate US$ relative to GDP in PPP US$) over the period 1955-1990. Following Alcalá and 
Ciccone (2004), we calculated real openness by multiplying (nominal) openness by the price level. The number of leads 
and lags in the individual DOLS regressions was determined by the Schwarz criterion with a maximum of three (five) 
lags for the PWT 5.6 (PWT. 6.2) sample. 
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Table 6 
DOLS country estimates and stability tests. 
Country  ln(T)  t-stat  MeanF  Country  ln(T)  t-stat  MeanF 
Argentina  -0.1208  -1.11  10.03**  Luxembourg  0.5847*  2.31  16.65** 
Australia  0.0973  1.10  4.19  Madagascar  0.1402*  2.07  2.43 
Austria  1.0333**  5.36  3.24  Malawi  0.5660**  4.33  2.08 
Belgium  0.9081**  5.12  15.80**  Malaysia  -0.3663**  -4.90  7.25* 
Benin  0.1730**  4.52  3.66  Mauritius  0.3932*  2.27  2.94 
Brazil  -0.4599*  -2.16  8.08*  Mexico  -0.4567**  -6.64  21.49** 
Burkina Faso  0.0153  0.50  1.81  Morocco  -0.8603**  -8.67  3.92 
Burundi  -0.4250**  -5.81  17.38**  Mozambique  0.5616**  6.53  1.89 
Cameroon  -0.3859*  -2.21  8.03*  Nepal  0.0733  1.65  22.08** 
Canada  0.2260**  3.28  2.81  Netherlands  1.7712**  9.60  2.81 
Chile  1.0147**  3.84  19.16**  New Zealand  0.1406  0.69  4.48 
China  -0.2223**  -3.34  2.28  Nicaragua  -0.0869  -0.81  23.01** 
Colombia  -0.4991**  -5.46  12.53**  Nigeria  0.0194  0.41  5.77 
Costa Rica  0.4908**  4.63  3.36  Norway  0.3065**  3.29  4.12 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.2625*  2.27  18.44**  Pakistan  0.3843  1.42  13.86** 
Denmark  2.1883**  6.28  4.31  Panama  -1.0165**  -5.43  3.14 
Dominican Republic  0.1727  1.63  2.68  Paraguay  -0.9748**  -5.79  7.06* 
Ecuador  -1.0723*  -2.02  15.87**  Peru  -0.3757**  -3.33  14.83** 
Egypt  -0.1405**  -2.72  5.13  Philippines  -0.9033**  -8.46  11.68** 
El Salvador  0.1573  1.60  8.03*  Portugal  0.1648  1.87  2.48 
Ethiopia  -0.0756  -0.64  3.21  Romania  -0.0675  -0.22  8.41** 
Finland  0.0865  0.60  5.53  Senegal  0.5676**  2.38  4.40 
France  0.4742**  2.94  3.74  Singapore  0.3104  1.28  6.00 
Gambia  -0.2517*  -2.21  6.48*  South Africa  -0.2050*  -2.15  1.23 
Greece  1.7661  1.44  2.46  Spain  1.1401**  5.16  2.92 
Guatemala  0.1592  1.60  7.22*  Sri Lanka  -0.1101**  -3.50  3.31 
Guinea  -0.3744**  -2.76  4.05  Sweden  0.2816**  3.08  4.29 
Honduras  -0.6165**  -4.50  5.39  Switzerland  0.5786*  2.18  5.41 
Hong Kong  -0.2436*  -2.36  1.40  Tanzania  -0.6387**  -3.67  14.52** 
India  0.2060**  9.80  0.83  Thailand  0.0537  0.60  1.04 
Indonesia  0.9490**  8.38  2.99  Trinidad & Tobago  -0.0887  -0.17  23.90** 
Ireland  0.6044**  4.63  10.44**  United Kingdom  0.4604**  4.21  2.70 
Israel  1.5980**  7.94  3.52  United States  0.2224*  2.70  2.45 
Italy  0.3654  1.74  24.03**  Uruguay  1.0172**  5.78  4.29 
Jamaica  0.5904**  3.99  5.10  Venezuela  -0.1717  -1.50  12.13** 
Japan  1.6716**  3.55  4.72  Zambia  -0.2919**  -3.21  2.77 
Jordan  0.7750**  10.65  4.47  Zimbabwe  -0.3792**  -6.65  3.87 
Korea, Republic of  0.0294  0.72  3.24 
















Notes: The dependent variable is Ln(Y). ** (*) indicate significance at the one (five) percent level. The number of leads 
and lags was determined by the Schwarz criterion with a maximum of five lags. The MeanF test is a Chow-type test for 
parameter constancy in cointegrating regressions. The five (one) percent critical value for the stability test (MeanF) is 





32   
Table 7 




















Notes: The number of degrees of freedom ˅ in the standard χ
2(˅) tests corresponds to the number of zero restrictions. 
The Fisher statistic is distributed as ˇ
2 with 2×N degrees of freedom. It has a critical value of 193.2 at the one-percent 





Variables and sources. 
Variables  Definition  Source 
ln(gdp)  Log of real per-capita GDP (in constant 2000 US dollars at PPP). 
Data averaged over the period 1975 to 2003. 
WDI 2008 
ln(schooling)  Log of the secondary school enrollment rate. Data averaged over the 
period 1991 to 2003. 
WDI 2008 
ln(credit)  Log of the private sector bank loans/GDP ratio. Data averaged over 
the period 1960 to 2003. 
WDI 2008 
ln(primaryexports)  Log  of the primary exports/GDP ratio. (Agricultural raw materials 
exports  +  food  exports  +  fuel  exports  +  ores  and  metals  exports 
divided by GDP). Data averaged over the period 1962 to 2003. 
WDI 2008 
ln(firing)  Log of flexibility of firing. Data are from 2003.    Doing Business,  
World Bank (2004) 
ln(businessfreedom)  Log  of  business  freedom.  Data  averaged  over  the  period  1995  to 
2003. 
Heritage Foundation 
ln(monfreedom)  Log of monetary freedom. Data averaged over the period 1995 to 
2003. 
Heritage Foundation 
ln(railway)  Log of kilometers of railways per square kilometer of land area. Data 
averaged over the period 1975 to 2003. 
WDI 2008 
ln(telephone)  Log of telephone mainlines per 1000 people. Data averaged over the 
period 1975 to 2003.  
WDI 2008 
ln(propertyrights)  Log of property rights. Data averaged over the period 1995 to 2003.  Heritage Foundation 
ln(corruption)  Log of corruption. Data averaged over the period 1984 to 2003.  PRS Group 
ln(govstab)  Log of government stability. Data averaged over the period 1984 to 
2003. 
PRS Group 
ln(bureaucratic)  Log of bureaucratic quality. Data averaged over the period 1984 to 
2003. 
PRS Group 
ln(invest)  Log of investment profile. Data averaged over the period 1984 to 
2003. 
PRS Group 
ln(socio)  Log  of  socioeconomic  conditions.  Data  averaged  over  the  period 
1984 to 2003. 
PRS Group 
ln(democratic)  Log  of  democratic  accountability.  Data  averaged  over  the  period 
1984 to 2003. 
PRS Group 
ln(intconflict)  Log of internal conflict. Data averaged over the period 1984 to 2003.  PRS Group 




Impact  of  trade  on  income,  individual  DOLS  estimates  of  the 
coefficient on ln(T) over the period 1960 to 2003. 
Table 6 
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Table 9 
Bivariate regressions of the estimated income effect of trade on several variables. 
Variables  Estimated coefficients (t-statistics) 
ln(monfreedom)              1.12* 
(2.51) 
   
ln(democractic)              0.100** 
(3.93) 
   
Notes: The dependent variable is  i  ˆ . t-statistics are in parenthesis. ** (*) indicate significance at the one (five) percent 
level.  The  higher  the  flexibility  of  the  firing  index,  ln(firing),  the  more  a  country  regulates  the  process  of  firing 
employed labor. Similarly, the indicators for corruption and external and internal conflict are rescaled so that higher 







ln(gdp)  0.25** 
(3.42) 
               
ln(schooling)    0.29* 
(2.47) 
             
ln(credit)      0.21* 
(2.35) 
           
ln(primaryexports)        -0.20* 
(-2.25) 
         
ln(firing)          -0.49** 
(-3.93) 
       
ln(businessfreedom)            0.81** 
(3.08) 
     
ln(railway)                0.25** 
(4.80) 
 
ln(telephone)                  0.17** 
(3.57) 
Adj. R
2  0.15  0.08  0.07  0.06  0.19  0.12  0.08  0.27  0.16 
ln(propertyrights)  1.00** 
(4.35) 
               
ln(corruption)    0.96** 
(4.18) 
             
ln(govstab)      2.29** 
(3.18) 
           
ln(bureaucratic)        0.58** 
(3.86) 
         
ln(invest)          1.89** 
(3.93) 
       
ln(socio)            1.21** 
(3.70) 
     
ln(intconflict)                0.78** 
(2.93) 
 
ln(extconflict)                  1.30* 
(2.22) 
Adj. R
2  0.25  0.22  0.14  0.19  0.19  0.17  0.19  0.11  0.06 
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Table 10 
Diagnostic tests: general specification.  
Without country dummies   
  JB (χ
2
(2))  18.13 [0.000] 
  RESET (χ
2
(1))  4.27 [0.039] 
  HET   F(18, 43) = 0.60 [0.881] 
  STABILITY  F(16, 44) = 1.35 [0.418] 
With country dummies   
  JB (χ
2
(2))  1.24 [0.538] 
  RESET (χ
2
(1))  0.55 [0.458] 
  HET   F(21, 40) = 1.12 [0.369] 
  STABILITY  F(44, 16) = 1.17 [0.754] 
Number of observations  62 
Notes: JB is the Jarque-Bera test for normality, RESET is the usual test for general nonlinearity and misspecification, 
HET is the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test  for heteroscedasticity, and STABILITY is an F-test for the equality of the 
variances of the first three-fourths versus the last one-fourth of the sample. Numbers in brackets behind the values of 








General-to-specific approach: final specification. 
Independent variable  Dependent variable:  i  ˆ  
ln(primaryexports)  -0.156* (-2.349) 
ln(firing)  -0.295* (-2.549) 
ln(propertyrights)   0.464*  (2.182) 
Denmark dummy  1.595** (3.145) 
Greece dummy  1.616** (3.216) 
Netherlands dummy  1.568** (3.060) 
Diagnostic tests   
Adj. R
2  0.52 
JB (χ
2
(2))  1.36 [0.442] 
RESET (χ
2
(1))  0.10 [0.756] 
HET   F(6, 55) = 0.32 [0.923] 
STABILITY  F(16, 44) = 1.12 [0.675] 
REST  F(15, 40) = 0.66 [0.848] 
Number of observations  62 
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses. ** (*) indicate significance at the one (five) percent level. JB is the Jarque-Bera 
test for normality, RESET is the usual test for general nonlinearity and misspecification, HET is the Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey test for heteroscedasticity, STABILITY is an F-test for the equality of the variances of the first three-fourths 
versus the last one-fourth of the sample, and REST is an F-test of the hypothesis that the model is a valid restriction of 
the general model. Numbers in brackets behind the values of the diagnostic test statistics are the corresponding p-
values. 
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Table 12 
Effects of adding further regressors individually to the Table 11 regression and correlation coefficients. 
Regressor  t-statistic of added variable  Correlation coefficients 
    ln(primaryexports)  ln(propertyrights)  ln(firing) 
ln(gdp)  -0.85  -0.44** (-3.72)  0.74** (8.49)  -0.47** (-4.05) 
ln(schooling)  -0.68  -0.10 (-0.76)  0.63** (6.18)  -0.35** (-2.83) 
ln(credit)  0.63  -0.13 (-1.04)  0.28* (2.24)  -0.30* (-2.44) 
ln(businessfreedom)  -0.82  -0.11 (-0.87)  0.79** (9.48)  -0.50** (-4.42) 
ln(monfreedom)  -0.39  -0.15 (-1.16)  0.62** (6.08)  -0.31* (-2.54) 
ln(railway)  1.19  -0.22 (-1.77)  0.54** (4.91)  -0.45** (-3.85) 
ln(telephone)  -0.75  -0.18 (-1.43)  0.75** (8.72)  -0.47** (-4.12) 
ln(corruption)  0.51  -0.20 (-1.60)  0.63** (6.30)  -0.40** (3.32) 
ln(govstab)  0.43  -0.07 (-0.56)  0.57** (5.40)  -0.44** (-3.77) 
ln(bureaucratic)  0.15  -0.21 (-1.61)  0.73** (8.17)  -0.46** (-4.02) 
ln(invest)  -0.06  -0.19 (-1.49)  0.82** (10.92)  -0.52** (-4.64) 
ln(socio)  -1.00  -0.19 (-1.49)  0.83** (11.55)  -0.53** (4.78) 
ln(democractic)  -0.07  -0.21 (-1.62)  0.76** (8.86)  -0.47** (-4.04) 
ln(intconflict)  -1.27  -0.07 (-0.54)  0.53** (4.80)  -0.38** (-3.12) 
ln(extconflict)  -0.08  -0.02 (-0.13)  0.53** (4.81)  -0.26* (-2.05) 
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Table 13 
Regressions of the estimated income effect of trade on the most significant correlates of the variables of the final 
specification. 
Variables  Estimated coefficients (t-statistics) 
ln(democractic)          0.65** 
(2.83) 
 
ln(intconflict)            0.30 
(1.09) 
Adj. R
2  0.40  0.41  0.43  0.41  0.41  0.34 
Notes: The dependent variable is  i  ˆ . t-statistics are in parenthesis. ** (*) indicate significance at the one (five) percent 
level.  Each  regression  includes  dummy  variables  for  Denmark,  Greece,  and  the  Netherlands.  The  indicators  for 























ln(gdp)  0.15* 
(2.24) 
         
ln(schooling)    0.17 
(1.67) 
       
ln(businessfreedom)      0.52* 
(2.30) 
     
ln(railway)        0.14** 
(2.80) 
   
ln(telephone)          0.10* 
(2.36) 
 
ln(corruption)            0.58** 
(2.71) 
Adj. R
2  0.38  0.36  0.39  0.50  0.39  0.40 












ln(govstab)  1.68** 
(2.75) 
         
ln(bureaucratic)    0.39** 
(2.90) 
       
ln(invest)      1.36** 
(3.21) 
     
ln(socio)        0.80** 
(2.73) 
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Fig. 2. Stability Tests. Outliers (Denmark, Greece, Netherlands) were excluded to compute the recursive residuals and 
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